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Gammon: Indigent's Bankrupcty Rights

A REAPPRAISAL OF THE INDIGENT'S RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
TIMOTHY E. GAMMON*

I. INTRODUCTION
N 1963, Robert F. Kennedy stated, "To a serious extent, the scales of
justice in this country are weighed against the poor"' One year later,
the Office of Economic Opportunity was created, which helped balance the
2
scale in some areas by providing legal service programs for indigents.
Nevertheless, the enormous need of legal service for indigents has not and
cannot be met under present programs.' The 1964 legal service program
failed to provide money for fees and court costs in judicial and administrative
proceedings so petitioners who could not proceed in jorma pauperis were
denied access to those proceedings. No person is poorer or in greater need
of relief than the indigent who must resort to bankruptcy, who is in a
hopeless bargaining position, totally destitute, and who has neither fifty
dollars, nor hope of having fifty dollars within six months.
As the Bankruptcy Act4 presently exists, it denies an indigent the same
right, privilege, and relief afforded every other citizen under the Act. To
state that the indigent petitioner would not be assisted by a provision
waiving the fees and costs, or that he can obtain this right, privilege, and
relief at some future date does not justify the invidious discrimination, which
*LL.M. Candidate, June 1976, Harvard University Law School; J.D., St. Louis University Law
School; Member, Missouri State Bar Association.
1 Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1963). See also Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73
YALE L.J. 1317, 1337 (1964) (Reprint of speech by Senator Robert Kennedy):
Helplessness does not stem from the absence of theoretical rights. It can come from the
inability to assert real rights. The tenants of slums and public housing projects, the
purchasers from disreputable finance companies, the minority group members who are
discriminated against-all of these may have legal rights which if we are candid-remain
in the limbo of the law.
J. Gardner, Preface to A. BLAusTEIN & R. WOOCK, MAN AGAINST POVERTY: WORLD WAR Ill
(1968); See generally L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS

(1965).
2 42 U.S.C.

§§2701

FOR THE POOR:

A

et seq. (1964).

See L. SILVERSTEIN, AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SFRVICES

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CASE STUDIES OF SAMPLE COUNTIES

(1966);

A. SUTHERLAND, THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967 (1968); Tucker, The Private Lawyer

and Public Responsibility-The Profession's Armageddon, 51 NEB.L.REv. 367 (1972).
3 See Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and the
Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REV. 223 (1970) (hereinafter
cited as Goodpaster); Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why
and How to Limit Caseload, 46 J. URBAN L. 217 (1969). Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal
Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. URBAN L. 549 (1967); Cf. Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. RV.381, 409-10 (1965).
4 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1971).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976

[531]

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 3
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:3

results from wealth classification and the denial of access to courts and
administrative proceedings for indigents who cannot pay fees and costs.
Beyond the evident injustice underlying such denial of access, it represents
what can be considered as dangerous precedent for further limitation of due
process and equal protection. It is clear that there is a need for egalitarian
legislation which would provide for a right of access to court and administrative proceedings that could not be denied because of the petitioner's
inability to pay costs and fees. Until such legislation is enacted, the situation
requires evaluation under the principles outlined by the fourteenth amendment
and interpreted by the courts.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
A review of the arguments and decisions, with regard to the right of
access to a bankruptcy court, indicates the complexity of the matter. Any
attempt to unravel the confusion resulting from this complexity must at
the outset deal with the construction of the term "access." While many have
attempted a definition by describing its ramifications, one judicial decision
has supplied a simple and concise interpretation: entry to the broad, intricate
scheme for dispute settling and the enforcement of public and private rights
when what is desired is some remedy or settlement. 5
It is the right of access which is the concern here, and should therefore
be distinguished from any right to discharge in bankruptcy which is outside
the scope of this article. There is no doubt that this right to be heard is more
fundamental than any right to a discharge in bankruptcy.6
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances was a
major provision of the Magna Carta.7 In America, this right was specifically
included in the Bill of Rights. James Madison's early draft of what became
our first amendment included the right to apply "to the legislature by petition"
and congressional debate extended this to all elected representatives of the
5 In re Smith, 323 F.Supp. 1082, 1089 (D.Colo. 1971).
See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Schroeder v. New York,

6

371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962); United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934);

Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 414 (1897). But see Recent Developments, Requiring Filing
Fees as a Prerequisiteto Bankrupty Discharge for Indigents Is Unconstitutional, 60 GEO. L.J.

1581, 1587 (1972) (petitioners in bankruptcy do not just want relief from creditors, they
want a new legal basis for their economic future).

7 F. MArrILAND & F. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 208 (7th ed. 1927)
[hereinafter cited as MAITLAND & MONTAGUE]; 1 SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 21 (R. Perry

ed. 1959): The Magna Carta stated, "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or
delay, right of justice," [hereinafter cited as SOURCES]. Even during the reign of Henry III
(1216-1272), paupers did not have to pay court costs. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MATLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195 (2d ed. 1968): "That the poor should have their writs

for nothing was an accepted maxim."
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people.8 But the version which was enacted provided this right of access to
the entire government, a significant change since it resulted in the right of
9
petition to the judicial and administrative branches of government. This
was reinforced by the Civil Rights Act of 1870, which provided equal access
and rights for all persons embraced within the jurisdiction of the American
judicial system.' ° The Supreme Court long ago identified the fundamental
importance of this right of access.
The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force.
In an organized society, it is the right conservative of all other rights,
and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the
highest and most essential privileges of citizenship ....
A remedy which would be satisfactory and yet fall short of abolishing
all court costs and fees would be to provide procedures whereby indigents
could proceed without funds. An alternative would be to require that all
fees and costs be waived in appropriate situations. The approach at common
law was to allow the court in its discretion to waive fees; yet, the obvious
problem is that there was no right to proceed and it was only the court's
benevolence which allowed the indigent to proceed."
Long before Robert Kennedy voiced concern for the poor, provisions
were made for individuals without financial resources to proceed in forma
pauperis. This right to petition in Anglo-American law, even without financial
resources to pay fees and costs, can be traced to the Magna Carta, although
the right at that time applied exclusively to those who otherwise could sue.
Only later was it extended to all classes of citizens." In America, there was
a reluctance to grant indigents this concession, although several statutes
were enacted which allowed indigents to proceed in forma pauperis."
A literal reading of the Bankruptcy Act at first glance would seem to
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 452, 766 (1836); Comment, A First Amendment Right of Access
to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144. See also Note, Constitutional Law: Free
Divorce for the Indigent, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 180 (1971).
11 Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., R. R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). See also E. CORWIN,

81

THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY

201 (1 1th ed. 1954).

See Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in
Civil Cases, 2 VALPA. L. REV. 21 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Silverstein, Waiver and
Appointment].
23 See MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 7; SOURcES, supra note 7, at 21. See also
Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 363-79 (1923); Note, Indigent
Access to Civil Courts: The Tiger Is at the Gates, 26 VAND. L. REV. 25, 30-32 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Indigent Access to Civil Courts].
See also Silverstein, Waiver and Appointment, supra
'1 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
note 12.
12
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lead to the conclusion that indigents in bankruptcy could proceed in forma
pauperis the same as every other class of petitioners in federal courts, even
though the Act contained mandatory fee provisions." The Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 specifically provided for pauper petitions and it also provided, as
an alternative, for waiver of fees at the time of filing the petition by an
affidavit to pay. 6 These provisions were sufficient to prevent wealth-based
discrimination because they assured access to bankruptcy proceeding regardless of petitioners' economic status. The Referees Bill of 1946 changed this
by deleting the above provisions and substituting in their place a provision
that bankruptcy fees could be paid in installments. 7 Nevertheless, it is
certain that legal writers and the judiciary are convinced that in forma
pauperis is not available to an indigent petitioner in bankruptcy under the
existing law. 8 There is also little doubt that Congress intended payment at
filing or by installment to be a condition precedent to discharge. 9 This
congressional intent was enacted as the specific statutory requirement that
all installments must be paid in full before a discharge would be granted.2"
The Bankruptcy Act itself provides no relief for individuals who have
neither the mandatory fees nor hope of having that amount within six months;
and, in essence, this results in the denial of access to bankruptcy to indigents
as a class.
Initially, it should be established that access to bankruptcy proceedings
stands on the same ground as access to any court.2 ' The Constitution specifically provided for bankruptcy and left the organization and administration to
Congress.2 Congress established a procedure and special courts which are
quasi-judicial, quasi-administrative in nature. These proceedings are as
valuable and worthy of protection as any strictly judicial remedy an indigent
may have. The similarity between bankruptcy and ordinary court proceedings
15 Bankruptcy Act §4(a), 11 U.S.C. §22(a) (1970).

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 558, 588-89. See also General Order 35(4),
172 U.S. 665 (1898).

16

"7Bankruptcy Act

2 CCH Pov. L. RER.

§40(c)(1),

11 U.S.C.

§68(c)(1)

(1970).

But see In re Passwater,

15,075 (S. D. Ind. 1971), where the court permitted an indigent to

proceed in forma pauperis.
Is See In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. I11. 1972); In re Partilla, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.
13,885 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Comment, Constitutional Law Indigent's Filing Fee as a
Condition Precedent to Discharge in Bankruptcy Held Unconstitutional, 21 J. PUB. L. 239
(1971); Note, Bankruptcy Filing Fee Subjected to Constitutional Test, 50 N.C.L. REV.
654 (1972); Note, Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Right of an Indigent to File Without
Payingthe Required FilingFee, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 437 (1972).

19See S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946). See also Schaffer, Proceedings in
Bankruptcy In Forma Pauperis, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1211 (1969).

20 Bankruptcy Act §§14(b), [14(c)(8), [59(c), [11 U.S.C.
(1), 95(g) (1971).
21 But see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
22 U.S. CONST. art I, §8.
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has been acknowledged: "Bankruptcy proceedings are stamped throughout
with judicial imprimatur. The referees or judges ... have the general power
to decide legal questions which arise in such proceedings, including the
constitutional question (access) before this court.""
There is, therefore, no rational basis for denying indigents access to
bankruptcy proceedings because such proceedings are labeled administrative
instead of judicial. If labels were controlling, the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Kras" would compel reversal of recent Supreme Court
decisions" in which it was held that juveniles were entitled to rights and
privileges in juvenile hearings similar to those afforded adults in criminal trials.
Individuals should be afforded the same right of access and constitutional
safegrounds whenever adjudication can effect their life, liberty, or property,
regardless of the label the proceeding itself has been given. It would be an
injustice to assume that constitutional rights and privileges apply to such a
narrow spectrum that they could be effectively denied by changing the label
of the proceeding.
The Supreme Court has not focused on the first amendment right to
petition in recent cases involving indigents who sought access to judicial
and administrative proceedings.26 Nevertheless, in addition to the historical
basis as seen in the legislative history of the first amendment, there is judicial
precedent for allowing access to proceedings under the first amendment.
To this end, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of access to courts
where unions sought to assist their members in litigation brought under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act.2
A 1966 Supreme Court decision struck down a Virginia poll tax on
the theory that it involved an invidious discrimination against the poor and
denied them their right to participate in government and the democratic
process. 8 In equating the Court's position on poll tax with the right of
22

ln re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1089 (D. Colo. 1971).

24 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
25 See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
26 Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, petition for rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973);

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
See also note 40 and accompanying text infra.

2? See United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1970); United
Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R. R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button,

371 U.S. 415 (1963). See also Birkly & Murphy, Interest Group Conflict in the Judicial
Arena: The First Amendment and Group Access to the Court, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 1018

(1964);

Comment, Constitutional Protection for Group Legal Service Plans, 44 NOTRE

DAME LAw. 220 (1968).
2

sHarper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Note, Constitutional Law-

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection-State Poll Tax Prerequisite to Voting-Denial

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 3, Art. 3
AKRON LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 9:3

indigents to bring suit it has been noted that the performance of the judicial
functions are "at least as important as the electorial process." 9 However,
one inherent weakness in the utilization of the poll tax case to argue that the
fees and costs of bankruptcy should be waived for indigents is that the
Court there did not simply hold that poll tax be waived for indigents, but
rather the Court struck down poll tax in its entirety for all citizens."
A similar result emerged in a 1972 decision which struck down filing fees
for all candidates in state primaries; and, although the Court reached the same
result, it approached the problem under a different theory.31 In that decision,
the Court held it would be a denial of equal protection to permit filing fees.32
These two decisions would tend to support the abolishment of fees and costs
altogether. But a less drastic solution could have been used in these decisions.
A reasonable solution in bankruptcy proceedings would be to require that
the fees and costs be waived for indigents in appropriate situations, or the
reinstatement of in forma pauperis provisions.
There is a basis for the use of the first amendment to allow all
citizens access to any legislative, judicial, or administrative proceeding where
determinations will be made affecting their life, liberty, or property. The
fullest expression of this principle was by a Supreme Court case in 1972."
Because the circumstances there involved the right to an administrative
hearing concerning business operations and the transportation of goods,
the case is of particular significance to bankruptcy proceedings, which are of
a judicial-administrative nature.
The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill
of Rights . .

.

.The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens

or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures
of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third
branch of Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but
one aspect of the right to petition.3"
of Equal Protection-Harperv. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 16 AM. U. L. REV. 128
(1966); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 124, 176 (1966); Note,
Constitutional Law-Poll Tax-Violative of Equal Protection-Harperv. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 189 (1967); Note, Constitutional Law-The Poll Tax, 8
WM. & MARY L. REV. 161 (1966).
29

In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo 1971).

30383 U.S. 663 (1966).

81 Bullock

v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).

32 Id.

32 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
34 Id.

at 510, citing Eastern R. R. Conference v. Noer Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1961). See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
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Other arguments on right of access are tied to the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments respectively.
Because of their complexity and interrelation they are considered in the
following section.
III.

FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS-DUE
AND EQUAL

PROCESS

PROTECTION

The fourteenth amendment, which requires citizens be extended equal
8
protection under law, applies to the states but not the federal government.
The fifth amendment, which does contain an equal protection principle,
6 Yet, the
applies to the federal government as well as the states.
absurdity of arguing that due process only applies to procedure and the
federal government has no obligation to provide equal protection is seen by
the logical extension of such argument. This extension would imply that
as long as due process were afforded, and access to court was provided, the
federal government could discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or religion
by denying relief in any case on any basis. 7
CONST. amend. XIV. On the development and use of the fourteenth amendment,
see Avins, The Equal "Protection" of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L.F.
385 (1966); Barnett, The Balance of Interests in the Equal Protection of the Laws, 29
ORE. L. REV. 65 (1950); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict
of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1960); Frank & Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950); Gunther,
Foreward: In search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). For a general explanation and analysis of the enactment
and judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, see 2 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY 53-125 (1932); 2 CRossKEY, POLITICS ANt) THE CONSTITUTION 1083-1158 (1953);
85 U.S.

FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 533-621 (rev. ed. 1937); Corwin, The Supreme Court

and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1909); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949); Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950
Wisc. L. REV. 479; Howe, A Footnote to the "Conspiracy Theory," 47 YALE L.J. 1007
(1939); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of
Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive
Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Suthon, The Dubious Origin of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 28 TuL. L. REV. 22 (1953).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921): ". . . (the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment) tends
to secure equality of law in the sense that it sets a required minimum of protection for
everyone's right of life, liberty, and property, which the Congress or the legislation may
not withhold."; Antieau, Equal Protection Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 362 (1952).
Contra, Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp.,
314 U.S. 463 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
37 Several articles dealing with the application of "equal protection" to the federal government
suggest that it could provide a remedy to indigent petitioners. See, e.g., Michelman, Forward:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969)
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Both equal protection and due process involve an idea of fairness and
reasonableness and to that extent overlap and apply to both federal and
state actions and tribunals. This idea was presented in a bankruptcy proceeding where the court relied on Supreme Court cases dealing with indigent
criminal defendants and civil rights.
[W]e do not mean to suggest that fifth amendment due process takes
in all of fourteenth amendment equal protection. It is enough to note
that fifth amendment due process does include an equal protection
principle and that the two are co-extensive insofar as they prohibit
discriminations which are based upon race and other discriminations
which are invidious or deprive persons of constitutional rights. 8
The most common area in which the fifth and fourteenth amendment
have been used to provide access have been in criminal cases, and in related
appeals and civil proceedings. One landmark case involved a criminal
defendant who had been denied a statutory right of appeal because of his
inability to pay the necessary fees to get a transcript." The Supreme Court
held the denial was a violation of equal protection and due process and
stated: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has."'"
In 1966, the Court stated that once opened, access to courts
must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede equal access
to the courts." Thus, support is gained for the contention that if indigents
[hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Wilcox, Justice Lost by What Appellate Papers Cost, 33
N.Y.U.L. REv. 934 (1958); Comment, Poverty and Equal Access to the Courts: The
Constitutionality of Summary Dispossess in Georgia, 20 STAN. L. REv. 766 (1968); Note,
Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARv. L. REV. 435
(1967); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
See also cases cited note 40 infra.
38In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (D. Colo. 1971).
3 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969);
Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966). See also Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents
and Aftermath, 25 U. C. L. REv. 151 (1957); Note, Failure to Provide Transcript Without
Cost to Indigent Defendants Violates Equal Protection Clause, 34 TExAs L. REv. 1083
(1956); Comment, Due Process and Equal Protection: Right of an Indigent Defendant
to a Transcriptof the Trial, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 274 (1957).
40 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). See also Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748
(1967); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Lane v. Brown 372 U.S. 477 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 373 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
41 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). On the right to counsel of indigent defendants,
see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Beany, Right to Counsel, Past, Present,
and Future, 49 VA. L. REv. 1150 (1963); Bennett, Right to Counsel-A Due Process
Requirement, 23 LA. L. REv. 662 (1963); Craig, The Right to Adequate Representation
in Criminal Process: Some Observations, 22 Sw. L.J. 260 (1968); Day, Coming: The
Right to Have Assistance of Counsel at All Appellate Stages, 52 A.B.A.J. 135 (1966);
Fronton, Appellate Counsel for the Indigent Accused, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 417 (1967);
Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv.
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are allowed to begin the bankruptcy proceedings because of a promise to
pay or installment arrangements, they should be entitled to an adjudication
regardless of whether they are able to actually pay the costs and fees. The
Supreme Court has also considered the problem of access for indigents and
stated: "Differences in access to the instruments needed to vindicate legal
rights, when based upon the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution." 2 Since the right of access on an equal protection
and due process basis was first recognized by the Supreme Court, at least two
federal appellate courts have upheld the right in habeas corpus actions, which
were civil proceedings brought in federal courts. "3 In a strong decision, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
established that equal protection also applied to civil cases.
The equal protection clause applies to both civil and criminal cases;
the Constitution protects life, liberty, and property. It is the importance
of the right of the individual, not the technical distinction between civil
and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding
what procedures are constitutionally required in each case. Often a poor
litigant will have more at stake in a civil case than in a criminal case ....
The right of all to have free access to the courts is basic to our democratic
system. It too cannot be conditioned on the payment of a fee where
such a condition precludes the exercise of the right.
Court procedures which of themselves invidiously discriminate
between the rich and the poor impair guarantees of equal justice
which the Constitution was designed to protect. As Shelley v. Kramer
teaches, the courts themselves may not be vehicles of discrimination."
Boiling v. Sharpe"5
Bolling was a companion decision to Brown v. Board of Education in
1175 (1970); Katz, Gideon's Trumpet: Mournful and Muffled, 55 IowA L. REv. 523 (1970);
Marden, Equal Access to Justice: The Challenge and the Opportunity, 19 WASH. & LEE
L REV. 153 (1962); Seidelson, The Right to Counsel: From Passive to Active Voice, 38
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849 (1970); Simeone & Richardson, Indigent and His Right to Assistance in Criminal Cases, 8 ST. Louis U. LJ. 15 (1963); Steele, The Doctrine of the Right
to Counsel: its Impact on the Administration of Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession,
23 Sw. L.J. 488 (1969); Stephens, The Assistance of Counsel and the Warren Court:
Post-Gideon Developments in Perspective, 74 DIcK. L. REv. 193 (1970); Tucker, The
Supreme Court and the Indigent Defendant, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1964); Watts, Indigent
Defendants and Criminal Justice, 42 N.C.L. REv. 322 (1964).
42

Roberts v. LaValle, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967).

43Pembrook v. Wilson, 370 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1966); Blair v. California,

340 F.2d 741
(9th Cir. 1965); Ragan v. Cox, 305 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1965). See also Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961); Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.

1065 (1969).
44 Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 901 (D. C. Cir. 1970).
45347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also J. GREENBERo,
213 (1959).
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1954, which held racial segregation in public education unconstitutional."
Boiling focused on the segregated school system in the District of Columbia. A
separate opinion was necessary because the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause had been the cornerstone of the Brown decision, but on
its face the fourteenth amendment did not apply to the District of Columbia.
The Court succinctly identified the problem of equating equal protection
and due process, and then resolved the problem simply but eloquently.
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia,
does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of
fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws"
is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process
of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always
interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. "7
The decision thus identified the fundamental fairness and equality which is
required by both due process and equal protection, and held further that
the Constitution required fair treatment by the federal government., 8
In declaring the alleged discrimination unconstitutional the Court noted
the absurdity of the contention that the Constitution meant to allow invidious
discrimination on the federal level while preventing it on the state level.
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states
from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on
the Federal Government. We hold that racial segregation in the public
46 Brown

v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. Rnv. 1 (1955); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421-30 (1960); Kelly, The Fourteenth
Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 1049 (1956); Kohn,
Social Psychological Data, Legislative Fact, and Constitutional Law, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
136 (1960); Roche, Plessy v. Ferguson: Requiescat in Pace? 103 U. PA. L. REv. 44 (1954);
Sanders, The School Segregation Cases, 7 VAND. L. RPv. 985 (1954); Waite, Race Segregation in the Public Schools: Jim Crow at the Judgment Seat, 38 MINN. L. REv. 612 (1954);
Comment, Separate but Equal Doctrine and the Segregation Cases, 19 ALBANY L. REv. 233

(1955).
47 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954);

Kills Crow v. United States, 451 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1971).
See also Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1, 13 (1939); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937).
48See Rossman, Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions-Bolling v. Sharpe, 40
A.B.A. 619 (1954); Note, Constitutional Law-Segregation in Public Schools, 15 LA. L.
REv. 204 (1954); Note, Supreme Court Equity Discretion: The Decrees in the Segregation
Cases, 64 YALE L. J. 124 (1954).
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schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of
9
law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Boiling case, by extension, provides a basis for prohibiting the
denial of access to the bankruptcy court, when that denial is the result of
an invidious and unconstitutional discrimination. A strong case for the use
of "equal protection" as a requirement of fundamental fairness can be
maintained, especially if wealth were to be treated on the higher constitutional test as a "suspect classification."'"
To apply Boiling to bankruptcy proceedings, it would be necessary
to establish that the fee provisions result in a suspect classification
based on wealth and an invidious discrimination, without an overriding
government interest. The Court would have to hold the Bankruptcy Act
as such an open and direct affront to equal protection that it is a denial
of due process. That the treatment by the Supreme Court of statutory
classifications under the equal protection clause is relevant to the instant
discussion, is evident first, because it shows the problem of applying Bolling
to indigents denied access to bankruptcy courts. Secondly, it indicates the
possibility of holding that there is an invidious discrimination which is so
flagrant a denial of equal protection as to amount to a denial of due process.
Finally, an appraisal of the Supreme Court's treatment of statutory classifications under the equal protection clause, illustrates, together with Kras,
Bolling, and Boddie v. Connecticut, the inconsistency, confusion, and
uncertainty with which the Court has approached equal protection. Since
the topic is equal protection, in most instances the statutes involved were
state not federal statutes.
The Supreme Court has utilized two separate tests in considering the
constitutionality of legislative classifications under the equal protection
clause." Legislative classification means simply a discrimination or grouping
of particular segments for specific reasons, either by design or by result.
Under the traditional test, in order to determine if a statutory classification
violated equal protection, the courts were faced with a presumption of
49 347 U.S. at 500. Cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).

(Marshall, J., dissenting); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 246 (1969); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
51See Developments in Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (1969).
Contra, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan J., dissenting) (there
50 Cf. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973)

is no solid basis for the doctrine of two equal protection standards to assess legislative
classifications). But see Gunther, Forward: In Search of An Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowak,

Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,

Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974).
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constitutionality if the classification was rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective. 5 Thus, the burden to overcome the minimal requirement was with the classification's challenger.
Later, the Supreme Court determined that the traditional test was
inadequate for protecting fundamental rights and it subsequently created
"a second test."53 This test, referred to most commonly as
the "compelling
interest test," required that the government establish not only that it had
a compelling interest which justified the law, but also that the distinctions
drawn by the law were necessary to fulfill that legislative purpose. The
governmental interest in requiring bankruptcy fees is that bankruptcy is
supposed to pay its own way; but, should this interest override the interest
of providing individuals with an adjudication of their claim to a discharge?
Is the classification of indigents and the distinction that you have no right
of access to a bankruptcy court unless you have fifty dollars reasonable?
The Court has employed this second test and required the state to
establish a compelling governmental interest and the necessity of the classification in furthering that interest only after a determination has been made
that there was either a suspect classification" or a fundamental interest"
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420
(1961); Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 578 (1938). See
also
Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1910); Dykstra, Legislative
Favoritism Before the Courts, 27 IND. L.J. 38 (1951); Warsoff, The Weight of the Presumption of Constitutionality Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 B.U.L. REv. 319 (1938);
Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States Constitution, 74 U. PA. L. REv.
331
(1926).
53 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). See generally Comment,
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Travel-Residency Requirements Constitute an Invidious
Discrimination Denying Applicants Equal Protection of the Laws, Violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Place a "Chilling Effect" on the Right of Interstate
Travel, 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 268 (1969); Note, Constitutional Law: Residency Requirements,
53 MARQ. L. REV. 439 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAav. L. REV.
118
5(1969).
4
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 663 (1948);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). On the suspect classification of
the
Japanese and their relocation during World War II, see THOmAs & NAsIIMOTO,
THE
SPOILAGE (1946); Alexander, The Nisei-A Casualty of World War II, 28
CORNELL L.Q.
385 (1943); Freeman, Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus--Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law,
28
CORNELL L.Q. 414 (1943); Rostow, Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster,
54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945); Wolfson, Legal Doctrine, War Power, and Japanese Evacuation, 32 Ky. LJ.
328
(1944); Comment, Constitutional Aspects of War Relocation Authority and Japanese
Americans, 11 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 482 (1943); Comment, Civil Rights and Anti-Japanese
Discrimination, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 81 (1949). On suspect classification of different
races
and the unconstitutionality of anti-miscegenation statutes, see Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S.
1 (1967); Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original
Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1966); Riley, Miscegenation Statutes-A Reevaluation
of
Their Constitutionality in Light of Changing Social and Political Conditions, 32 S.
CAL.
L. REv. 28 (1958); Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegenation
Statutes, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 208 (1957).
55See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois,
52
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which justified subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny. 6 The compelling
interest test increases the likelihood that the statute will be struck down
by reversing the presumption of constitutionality and placing the burden
on the government. This test will obviously be used in cases involving
voting rights, school segregation, and criminal defendants since it was in
these cases that the compelling interest test and the concepts of suspect
classification and fundamental interest were first developed; and historically,
the equal protection clause was "largely a product of the desire to eradicate
legal distinctions founded upon race."57
Consequently, the Court may be reluctant to act in picking out particular
interests, like education or access to bankruptcy courts, and characterizing
them as fundamental interests, since such a decision may place the Court
on the level of a super legislature."
The Court in recent decisions has narrowed the equal protection clause
and the role of the Court in judging legislative classifications by its treatment
of interests which could have been labeled fundamental. In one case, the
Court held the traditional test was better than the compelling interest test
because the former did not allow federal courts to impose their views of
what constituted wise economic or social policy upon government." A
351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also notes 28 & 39 supra. On the fundamental rights or interests
interpretatioin of the due process clause, see generally 2 BouDnI, GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
374-442 (1932); CoRwIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 116-83 (1948); 2 CRossKEY,
PoLITIcs AND THE CoNsTITToN 1119-58 (1953); H. WECHSLER, THE NATIONALZATION
OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIvIL RIGHTS (1970); Barnett, Vested Rights in the Common

,Law, 27 ORE. L. REv. i25 (1947); Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in American
Constitutional Law, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1954); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background
of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. Rv. 149, 365 (1928-29); Hyman & Newhouse, Standards for Preferred Freedoms, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1965); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and a Criticism, 66 YALE L. J.
319 (1957); Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv.
L. REv. 431 (1926).
5

6See Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Comment, Validity of Sex Offenders
Acts, 37 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1939); Comment, Sane Laws for Sexual Psychopaths, 1
STAN. L. REv. 486 (1949); See generally Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas
and the Return of the "Natural-law-due-process-formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716 (1969);
Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REv. 629 (1970); Symposium,
Equal Protection 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 941 (1968).
57Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969)

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

58 Id.

59 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also Comment, Legal Rights of
AFDC Recipients After Rosado v. Wyman and Dandridge v. Williams, 21 AM. U. L. REv.
207 (1971); Comment, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971); Note, Social Welfare-Maryland's Maximum
Grant Regulation on AFDC Payments Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause Nor
Is It Inconsistent with the Social Security Act, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 416 (1971); Note,
Constitutional Law-The Maximum Welfare Grant, 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 271 (1970);
Note, Equal Protection-A Judicial Cease Fire in the War on Poverty?, 36 Mo. L. REv.
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second decision considered the possible racial implications of an article in
the California constitution which required community approval before
initiating low-rent housing projects. 0 The Court was satisfied the article
did not classify on the basis of race and it decided not to declare the article
unconstitutional merely because it prevented some individuals from obtaining
public housing. The Court refused to even consider whether the California
provision classified citizens on the basis of wealth. In Boddie v. Connecticut,6 1
the Court could have declared it was a denial of equal protection to bar
indigents from divorce courts because they could not pay court costs; yet,
the Court held the petitioners did have a right to proceed without payment
of fees under the due process clause. Boddie could thus be interpreted as
a philosophical stand-off because if it was an expansion of due process, then
it was also a limitation of equal protection.
A comparison of the equal protection aspects of these three pre-Kras
decisions with decisions in which the Court used the compelling interest
test reveals the critical determinant in deciding whether the traditional test
or the compelling interest test should be utilized is the characterization of
the statutory classification and the interests of those classified. Nevertheless,
the Court has never required that a state establish a compelling interest or
the necessity of a wealth classification unless it first found the statutory
classification affected a fundamental interest of the person assailing the
statute.
There is no reason to believe the Court will invoke equal protection
until they are persuaded a fundamental interest, i.e., the right of access to
117 (1971); Note, Dandridge v. Williams: Equal Protection and Welfare Law, 1 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOc. CIANGE 119 (1971). For comments favorable to the position of welfare petitioners and the dissent of Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall in Dandridge, see O'NEII,
THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY; CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WELFARE STATE (1970); Dienes, To

Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 555
(1970); Graham, Civil Liberties Problems in Welfare Administration, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV.
836 (1968); Reinstein, The Welfare Cases: Fundamental Rights, the Poor and the Burden
of Proof in ConstitutionalLitigation, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1970).
60James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See generally Lefcoe, The Public Housing
Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384 (1971);

Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Mandatory Referendum on Low-Income
Housing, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 603 (1972); Comment, The Poor, Equal Protection,
and Public Housing: James v. Valtierra-Where to from Here?, 20 KAN. L. REV. 253
(1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and the "Right" to Housing, 50 N.C.
L. REv. 369 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Mandatory Referendum Approval of
Low-Rent Housing Projects, 46 TUL. L. REV. 806 (1972); Note, James v. Valtierra: Housing
Discrimination by Referendum?, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 115 (1971); Note, Mandatory Referendum and Approval for Low-Rent Housing Projects: A Denial of Equal Protection?, 25
U. MIAMI L. REV. 790 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law-Public Housing for Low-Income
Families-Mandatory Referendum Requirement, James v. Valtierra, 1972 Wxsc. L. REV.

268.
61401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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bankruptcy courts, and a suspect classification, i.e., denying only indigents
access, are involved. But, the Court could apply equal protection by way
of due process to reach the succinct conclusion that requiring a fifty dollar
filing fee and denying indigents access to bankruptcy involves a suspect
classification which touches upon a fundamental interest triggering active
judicial review and application of the compelling interest test.
IV. ACCESS TO BANKRUPTCY UNDER AN EQUAL PROTECTION THEORY
Having reviewed the problems and possibilities with equal protection,
it is plain that precedent applies for both the positive and negative sides.
Equal protection standards could be invoked to guarantee a right of access
to bankruptcy proceedings, which is not conditioned on petitioner's ability to
pay costs and fees. Equal protection criteria requires finding: first, a fundamental right of petitioner; second, a suspect classification which effectively
denies petitioner his right; and, third, that there is no overriding governmental
policy. The following will attempt such a brief but positive analysis and
application affording grounds for the invocation of equal protection.
Identifying or declaring that an interest is a fundamental right is
difficult. Often such determinations turn on the beliefs and prejudices of the
individual or court which has to make the decision. A better approach would
be to ask what interests and to what degree should existing interests be
3
protected. 2 Bankruptcy does involve the functioning of a court; and,
6
there should be a right of access to that court. Although the Constitution
specifically provides for bankruptcy, there cannot be found any suggestion
or direct implication that bankruptcy was intended and included only for
those who have fifty dollars. Yet, it should once again be emphasized that
the fundamental right is not the discharge in bankruptcy, rather it is the
access to the bankruptcy proceeding.
Rather than simply declaring wealth or any other single factor as
suspect per se, the far more beneficial course involves the identification of
the essential elements of an invidious classification. Among the numerous
attempts at identifying such elements of invidious classifications, Professor
Michelman seems to offer some clear-cut guidelines for evaluation:
62See Goodpaster, supra note 3; Note, DiscriminationAgainst the Poor and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 81 HAlv. L. REv. 435, 437-38 (1967).
63
See 11 U. S. C. § 1 (1970). See also Collet v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545 (1919); Mt. Vernon
Hotel Co. v. Block, 157 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1946). See generally D. COWENS, BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE (1963).
64
See In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1087 (D. Colo. 1971). See also Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439
(1967); Comment, Constitutional Law-Indigent's Filing Fee as a Condition Precedent to
Discharge in Bankruptcy Held Unconstitutional, 21 J. PUB. L. 239, 243 (1971); Indigent
Access to Civil Courts,supra note 13, at 25, 38.
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An "invidious" classification or trait is one which combines, in greater
or lesser degree and in varying proportions, three qualities: (1) a
general ill-suitedness to the advancement of any proper governmental
objective; (2) a high degree of adaption to uses which are oppressive
in the sense of systematic and unfair devaluation, through majority
rule, of the claims of certain persons to nondiscriminatory sharing in
the benefits and burdens of social existence; (3) a potency to injure
through an effect of stigmatizing certain persons by implying popular
or official belief in their inherent inferiority or undeservingness.6 '
While the government objective, which is the third element, will be considered later, the other two elements are best considered together at this point.
The second element is present in wealth classifications. Certainly
poverty and oppression are the end result of virtually all discrimination and
so discrimination on the basis of wealth in many ways is the cornerstone of
all discrimination. The Court has declared that classifications which are
directed against members of a disadvantaged minority are constitutionally
suspect.6 It has also been suggested that wealth would afford an independent
ground for strict judicial scrutiny." While Professor Michelman has expressed
reservations regarding the inclusion of wealth within those factors affording
an independent basis he has argued that wealth should be established as a
suspect classification:
The convincing reasons which can be offered for extremely skeptical
judicial inspection of official acts which explicitly classify by race . . .
seem applicable to statutes which explicitly or designedly classify by
wealth or income, in the sense of deliberatelysubdividing the population
according to wealth or income criterion for the purpose of extending
8
different treatment to the groups so distinguished."
Since the Supreme Court decision in Kras, only those who are truly indigent
and most in need of bankruptcy are denied access, which results as a practical
matter in such a deliberate discrimination on a wealth classification.
65

Michelman, supra note 37, at 20. See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)

(Brennan, J.); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065,
1124-27, 1173-76 (1969); Note, Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 81 HARv. L. REV. 435 (1967).
66 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
67 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
802, 807 (1969). See also Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Contra, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist.,
411 U.S. 1 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, petition for rehearing denied,
411 U.S. 922 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Michelman, supra note
37 at 21 (wealth is yet to become a suspect classification).
68

Michelman, supra note 37, at 20-21.
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The stigmatizing effect is an invariable result of wealth classifications.
Several responses to this element indicate that courts are not responsive to
the poor and some suggest the poor are even treated and regarded with
hostility.69 One writer has suggested that: "[T]here is a demonstrable hostility
7
on the part of courts to legal service offices and to litigation by the poor." "
This seems inconsistent with the nature and purpose of bankruptcy as
expressed by former Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren:
The Bankruptcy laws are laws of compassion, adopted by a compassionate government which wants to give a man an opportunity to
rehabilitate himself, get back into business, into the stream of economic
life, and contribute his part to the future.7"
The interest in removing invidious classifications should not be limited to
the discriminated minority. It is in the best interests of a democratic republic
to expand equal protection and due process to the four comers of society.
Every American should be provided equal access to all three branches of
government and every proceeding which may effect or determine life, liberty,
or property rights. The role of judicial and administrative proceedings, including bankruptcy, is very important inthis scheme.
If a man has no resort to law for protection, all the grandiose
language of the Constitution becomes a pious platitude. The denial of
access on the basis of wealth alone makes this discrimination all the
more invidious. Once access is established as a fundamental right, any
measure tending to limit that right "must be judged by the stricter
72
standard of whether it premotes a compelling state interest."
69

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

5-10 (1968);

Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 HARV. L. REv. 940 (1939).
7o Stumpf & Janowitz, Judges and the Poor: Bench Responses to Federally Financed Legal

Services, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1058, 1064-67 (1969). See also Goodpaster, supra note 3, at 228.

But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972); Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law,
87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973).
71 E.

WARREN,

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE FIRST SEMINAR

FOR

REFEREES

IN

BANKRUPTCY

(1964).
72 Comment, Access to Bankruptcy Court for Indigents: The Extension
Connecticut, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 328, 337 (1971). See also Note, Boddie
and the Constitutional Rights of Indigents, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 390, 402 (1972)
gants should have those services provided which would render their resort

1

of Boddie v.
v. Connecticut
(all civil litito the courts

truly effective.). On the general expansion of both procedural and substantive rights of

indigents and welfare recipients prior to Kras and Ortwein, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Accord, Fontaine, The ConstitutionalLaw of Remedies in Welfare Litigation, 23 ME. L. REv.
41 (1971); Cooley & Goldberg, The Search for Due Process in the Administration of
Social Welfare Programs, 47 N.D.L. REv. 209 (1971); O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and
Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 161; Packard, Fair
Procedure in Welfare Hearings, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 600 (1969); Smith, Due Process and
the Poor in Public Housing, 15 How. L.J. 422 (1969).
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The government's interest in denying indigents access and requiring
the payment of fees could be based on deterring unmeritorious litigation,
resource allocation, or cost recoupment. The Supreme Court has denied
access by determining that the fees are reasonable and bankruptcy must
support itself.73 One district court has attacked this reasoning, stating that,
"the government's purely economic justification for bankruptcy filing fees
is not a sufficiently compelling interest to make such fees a precondition of
access to the courts."7 This district court's position was supported in a
statement by Justice Brennan in a case considering access to other civil
proceedings. Justice Brennan indicated that the indigent's interest in being
heard was greater than the states' interest in imposing a fee requirement."'
It is difficult to uphold the fee requirement on the basis that bankruptcy
must pay its own way, because bankruptcy no longer pays its own way, as
indicated by comparatively recent statistics and reports advocating the abolishment of the principle of self-support for bankruptcy." Although never
enacted, legislation was introduced in Congress in 1971, to abolish selfsupport for the bankruptcy courts." In addition, there are no filing or hearing
fees for the analogous proceedings for workman's compensation and
unemployment benefits; and, the Social Security administration affords not
only free filing of applications and initial determinations, but also free
hearings and appeals."'
The issue has been whether to require fees in bankruptcy because it
must support itself, and the resultant fear that abuses will follow from not
requiring payment by all petitioners. The answer has been and continues
73 United
74

States v. Kras. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
1n re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150
(D. Ore. 1971). Compare In re Cheval, 386 F.2d
127 (3d. Cir. 1967); [and] In re Neiderheiser, 45 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1930), with St. Regis
Paper Co. v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1966), In re Solari Furs, 263 F. Supp. 658

(E.D. Mo. 1967), [and] In re Feinberg, 287 F. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1923) (A discharge in
bankruptcy is only a privilege or service and there is no right to a discharge.).
75Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 386 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
78 1970 JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINIsTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES CouRTs 24, 201 (1970); 1969 JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 23-24 (1969); Cyr,

Bankruptcy Courts in Transition Toward Debtor Rehabilitation, 22 ME. L. REv. 333,
346-47 (1970); Hufstedler, Consumers in Bankruptcy Land, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 199,

202 (1971).
77S. 1394, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. 4816, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See
generally Recent Developments, Requiring Filing Fees as a Prerequisite to Bankruptcy
Discharge for Indigents Is Unconstitutional, 60 GEO. L.J. 1581 (1972); Note, Bankruptcy
Filing Fee Subjected to Constitutional Test, 50 N.C.L. REv. 654 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Bankruptcy Filing Feel.
78 See CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP.
12,551-669; Note, Constitutional Law-Failure to Extend
Equal Protection To Guarantee Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts in Divorce
Proceedings, 17 N.Y.L.F. 634 (1971).
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to be yes."9 A policy decision should be made that no longer can citizens
be denied access to judicial or administrative proceedings based on indigency.
The focus then would become finding an appropriate remedy short of
abolishing fees which would also serve the government's interest in the
recoupment of costs and preventing abuse of non-payment provisions.
The Bankruptcy Act could be amended to provide that a petitioner
could proceed upon a finding or declaration of indigency. If income was
raised or found at any time during the proceeding the fee could be reinstated.
A second possibility would be to provide that the fee be paid out of future
assets or that the fee be withheld from discharge, both of which would have
the same effect. Even if self-support were not abandoned, it seems reasonable
that this policy could be adequately served by a statutory provision excluding
the government's claim for administrative costs from the scope of a discharge
without making non-payment a ground for denying the bankrupt relief from
his other obligations." ° In comparing Section 17 (a), which controls payment
of taxes as an exception to discharge, with Section 14(c), which lists
non-payment of filing fees as an objection to discharge, one writer has
suggested:
The government's interest in taxes is analogous to its interest in the
administration costs in bankruptcy that are provided by the filing fee.
Since the government already protects its interests in taxes by providing
that taxes remain outside a discharge, it seems reasonable that it could
similarly protect its interest in these administration costs. Thus the
government's claim for the filing fee could be treated simply as an
additional exception to a discharge under Section 17 a rather than as a
Section 14 c objection to a discharge. This is, in effect, what the
courts in Kras and Smith have done, and these two cases are an important
step toward making the bankruptcy discharge the substantial debtor's
remedy it was intended to be.8"
Boddie v. Connecticut "
The unanticipated approach of the Court and the ramifications of the
decision make the Supreme Court decision in Boddie important. Petitioners

V. DUE PROCESS

AND

79See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
80 See Bankruptcy Filing Fee, supra note 77.
81 1d. at 663-64. See also Bankruptcy Act §§ 14(c), 17(a), 11 U. S. C. §§ 32(c), 35(a)
(1970); In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082
(D. Colo. 1971). See also 1971 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY

DRAFT OF PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS UNDER CHAPTERS I TO VII
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 42 (1971) (Another relief-bringing change would be to provide

that a dismissal for failure to pay fees would be without prejudice unless otherwise stated).

82401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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in Boddie were denied access to divorce proceedings because of their inability
to pay court costs. They sought a declaration that the statute requiring
payment of costs as a condition precedent to obtaining court relief was
unconstitutional as applied to petitioners and all other members of the class
which they represented. The district court upheld the fee requirement,
the case was then argued before the Supreme Court in 1969 and reargument
was heard in 1970.83 Justice Harlan summarized the opinion of the majority.
Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage
relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant
state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship,
due process does prohibit a state from denying, solely because of
inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages. 8 '
The limits of the majority decision were identified in the last paragraph of
the opinion by Justice Harlan.
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is
a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not be
placed beyond the reach of any individual, for, as we have already
noted, in the case before us this right is the exclusive precondition to
the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.8"
Concurring in result Justice Douglas stated that indigents should be granted
a right of access in civil as well as criminal trials and appeals.8" He concluded
that all invidious classification, in this instance wealth classification, should
be held unconstitutional." Concurring in part, Justice Brennan criticized
the limits of the decision and stated the right of access to divorce proceedings
should extend to all proceedings.8 8 Justice Black in dissent, attacked the
use of due process and equal protection, and decried the practice of creating
Id. at 373, 374.
4 d. at 374.

83

85 d. at 382-83. But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (Harlan, J.) (Perhaps
no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its erection
and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its members,
enabling them to govern their affairs and definitely settle their differences in an orderly,
perdictable manner. Without such a legal system, social organization and cohesion are
virtually impossible; with the ability to see regularized resolution of conflicts individuals
are capable of interdependent action that enables them to strive for achievements without
the anxieties that would beset them in a disorganized society.).
86 Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring). See Griffin v. Illinois, 353 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
7
8 Id. at 386.

8IId. at 387-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
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fundamental interests and judging governmental action by the Court's sense
of fairness- 9
Several writers 0 foresaw the limitation of Boddie which occurred in
United States v. Kras. Yet much of the promise of Broddie came not from
the decision, but rather from writers who may have been too enthusiastic in
hoping for an expansion of that holding. One annotator appeared to advocate
application to bankruptcy when he said that in accordance with Boddie,
individuals with fundamental rights, which are capable of being settled only
in federal tribunals whether judicial or administrative, should be allowed
cost free access to these arenas."
Another commentator extended this to the sweeping suggestion that
all civil litigants should be provided these services, on the basis of due

process."

Other writers9" supported expansion of Boddie, although some

on a less definite bases. " Ironically, the strongest support for extension or at
least application of Boddie has come from the single Justice who opposed
granting a right of access to divorce proceedings. Dissenting from a denial
of certiorari in a later case, Justice Black identified the import of Boddie.
[T]he decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only one
crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each
of the States belong to the people of this country and that no person
can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal,
89 Id. at 389 (Black, J., dissenting).
90 See Note, Prepayment of Filing Fees as a Condition Precedent to the Grant of a Discharge
in Bankruptcy of an Indigent Petitioner Denies Equal Protection, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. 781
(1972). See also Michelman, supra note 37; Note, Boddie v. Connecticut: Free Access to Civil
Courts for Indigents, 76 DICK. L. REv. 749, 774 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-Due
Process Clause-Access to Divorce Courts for Indigents, 46 TuL. L. REV. 799, 806 (1972).
Note, ConstitutionalLaw-A State's Denial to Indigents of Access to It's Courts in a Divorce
Proceedings Due to Financial Barriers Is a Violation of Due Process, 20 KAN. L. REv. 554
(1972) (The degree to which a right is considered fundamental will vary according to the
attitudes and views of the different courts and the structure of society).
91 Comment, Boddie v. Connecticut: Whither the Indigent Civil Litigant?, 22 CATHOLIC U.
L. REv. 427, 433 (1973).
92 Note, Boddie v. Connecticut and the Constitutional Rights of Indigents, 45 TEMP. L.Q.
390 (1972).
9. Comment, Access to Bankruptcy Court for Indigents: The Extension of Boddie v. Con[hereinafter cited as Extension of Boddie];
necticut, 16 ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 328, 377 (1971)
Indigent Access to Civil Courts, supra note 13, at 25.
94 See Note, Constitutional Law-Access to Courts-Indigents Seeking Divorce Decree,
10 DUQUENSE L. REv. 123 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Equal Protection-State's Refusal to Permit Indigents to Institute Divorce Actions Without Prepayment
of Court Fees and Service Costs Is a Denial of Due Process, 47 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
366 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law: Free Divorce for the Indigent, 24 U. FLA. L. REV.
180 (1971).
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because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford
to hire a lawyer.9"
Later in the same opinion, Justice Black explained that exclusiveness of the
judicial process as a remedy was not a limitation because the States and
federal government held the ultimate power of enforcement in virtually every
dispute or claim. He added that because society places a relatively high
value on marriage and low value on divorce, virtually every other kind of
legally enforceable right should be considered as fundamental to society.
His conclusion left no doubt that access to bankruptcy proceedings was as
fundamental as access to divorce proceedings. 6 Justice Douglas echoed the
sentiments of Justice Black, and argued the equal protection clause should
have been an alternate basis for relief.
Courts ought not be a private preserve for the affluent. All these
cases (considered with Meltzer) contain an invidious discrimination
based on poverty, a suspect legislative classification ....
[O]btaining a fresh start in life through bankruptcy proceedings or
securing adequate housing and the other procedures in these cases,
seemingly come within the Equal Protection Clause ....
Clearly, the use of Boddie and due process would be a possibility in
analyzing the claim of an indigent who has been denied access to bankruptcy
proceedings. The advantage of using due process would be that while equal
protection invalidations require the infringement of a fundamental interest,
the Court, as Justice Douglas pointed out, has not "restricted due process
to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits
of fundamental rights."9 " The irony of this destinction has been explained,
as follows:
Justice Harlan's due process analysis, then, leads to waiver of court
fees in all forms of litigation. There is some irony in this, for the
majority's approach was seemingly calculated to avoid the breadth
of an equal protection analysis. The latter approach, however, might
have limited waiver of court fees to cases involving constitutionally
cognizable interests, such as marriage, race, or first amendment interests.
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88, cert. denied, 402 U.S.
954, 955-56 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (Justices Black and
Douglas stated their dissents were intended to apply not only to Meltzer, but also to the
denial of certiorari in the bankruptcy case. See In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971).
96 Id. at 957-58.
97 Id. at 961 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
98 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). See also Michelman, supra
95

note 37; Indigent Access to Civil Courts, supra note 13.
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No such limitations are possible under the majority's due process
approach, at least as structured by Justice Harlan."
Other commentators, however, see the situation as a limitation of equal
protection by relying on due process which requires more to overturn the
1°
statute, or in this case establish a right of access. 0 The Supreme Court
decision in Kras has limited the possibility that a right of access to bankruptcy
proceedings will be established in the near future.
VI. United States v. Kras'01
A. The DistrictCourt's Decision
William Robert Kras sought to file a bankruptcy petition. The clerk
of the federal district court, who was charged with assigning the case and
referring it immediately to a referee, refused to do so because the filing fee
had not been paid. Kras petitioned for leave to file a bankruptcy petition
without prepayment of filing fees and the matter was presented to Judge
Travia for determination instead of being sent directly to the bankruptcy
court for determination. 0 2
The affidavit in support of the motion depicted the circumstances.
Petitioner lived with his mother, niece, wife, and two children, the youngest
of which had cystic fibrosis. The family unit subsisted on a public assistance
allotment of less than four hundred dollars per month and petitioner had
over six thousand dollars in debts with no assets to pay them. Petitioner had
been discharged from his job with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
when premiums he had collected for them were stolen and he could not
replace the money. Since then petitioner had been unable to find work because
of bad references from the insurance company. Finally, because of indigency,
the sick child, and lack of employment, petitioner could neither pay nor
promise to pay the filing fee now or in installments.
The court dismissed the argument that there was a statutory right of
access within the Bankruptcy Act itself; but, it relied on Boddie, the dissent
in the denial of certiorari in Garland, the Colorado Smith opinion, and
petitioner's memorandum to find a right of access under the equal protection
9

0LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DuKE
L.J. 487, 536.
100 Note, Constitutional Law-Failure to Extend Equal Protection to Guarantee Indigent's
Right of Free Access to the Courts in Divorce Proceedings, 17 N.Y.L.F. 634 (1971).
See also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (Black, Harlan, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (Frankfurter, Harlan, & Whittaker, JJ., dissenting).
101 409 U.S. 434 (1973), rev'g 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
102 In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
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and due process meaning of the fifth amendment."' The court quoted from
Smith and held the issue was not simply bankruptcy, but access to court.
The court agreed the question thereby takes on "greater significance, at
least for those who are trained in the law and who regard the legal system
as fundamental to our way of life."' °
Judge Travia noted the status of petitioner as an indigent could be
challenged after the petition was filed and he suggested that the referee
provide in the ruling for survival of petitioner's obligation to pay the filing
fee. He added that the potential for abuse should not control in constitutional

areas. He relied on petitioner's memorandum to establish that granting the
motion of petitioner would not promote or result in increased frivolous
petitions by indigents. 13
In summary, the district court decision granted petitioner's motion to
file a petition in bankruptcy even though he had not and could not promise
to pay the costs and the clerk was thus ordered to file the petition and
refer it to the referee.
B. Reaction to the Decision of the FederalDistrict Court
While most writers saw the decision of Judge Travia as the logical
expansion of the right of access doctrine formulated in Boddie, some opposition was identifiable. The nature and extension of the doctrine was sarcastically identified in one article which focused on Boddie:
These expanded guidelines of invidious discrimination were possessed
of a manifest egalitarian rhetoric propounding the notion that the state
had embarked upon a discriminatory policy on the basis of wealth
equivalent to the 'traditionally disfavored' category of racial discrimina10 6
tion.
The unfavorable tone of the above comment was echoed in another article
1031d. at 1214.
0 Id. at 213, citing In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082, 1087 (D. Colo. 1971). (In language
identical to that in Kras the court conceded that although bankruptcy standing alone might
not be a fundamental right, what was at stake was not simply bankruptcy, but access to
court. Like the court in Kras, the court in Smith concluded access to court was more important

and fundamental to our legal system.).
105 In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207, 1215 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
108 Note, Constitutional Law-Failure to Extend Equal Protection to Guarantee Indigents"
Right of Free Access to the Courts in Divorce Proceedings, 17 N.Y.L.F. 634, 640-41 (1971).
Accord, Foster & Freed, Unequal Protection: Poverty and Family Law, 42 IND. L.J. 192,
198-200 (1967); Silverstein, Waiver and Appointment, supra note 12; Solomon, This
New Fetish for Indigency: Justice and Poverty in an Affluent Society, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
248 (1966); Willeing, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57
GEo. L.J. 253, 270 (1968).
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that attacked the position of the court in Smith, which was virtually identical
to the position of Judge Travia in Kras. The article concluded: "The
Smith decision represents a dangerous and unwarranted expansion of
0
Griffin." 7
A position contrary to the one in Kras was taken by another lower
federal court in In re Garland. °8 The First Circuit in Garland focused
on the right of discharge rather than the right of access. It held the rights
of an individual in bankruptcy were not fundamental, but were merely
privileges to which Congress could attach reasonable conditions. The court
explained that there were only two classifications of assetless individuals:
first, those who are attempting to conceal assets, and secondly, those who
presently have no assets but who expect to have assets in the future, and wish
to be rid of their creditors so they can enjoy them. The court summarily
dismissed the first group. The court considered the second group but said
only that their claim was not compelling enough to establish a constitutional
right to a discharge. It used the equal protection formula and stated that
usually equal protection and due process were denied only when laws were
applied differently to different persons under the same or similar circumstances. The court denied the claims that a fundamental interest was involved
and that the denial of the right to petition without payment of fees should be
held unconstitutional. 0 9
Five of six casenotes dealing with the district court decision were in
support of the decision and its logical extension. The sixth article discussed
the myriad of approaches and solutions which would be available to the
Supreme Court when it reviewed the decision. 10 The writer suggested that
it was unlikely that the Court would abandon the due process approach for
an equal protection approach since use of due process better enabled the
Court to limit the holding of Boddie and decide on a case-by-case basis
whether a claimed right was fundamental. The article concluded that the
11 1
choice of an applicable standard would be the key to the Court's decision.
One writer praised the
of right of access to courts
whether there was a right
liberty, and franchise."' A

district court for focusing on the correct issue
instead of becoming mired in consideration of
of discharge comparable to the rights of life,
second article stated that the decision was an

RICHMOND L. REv.
175, 180 (1971).
108 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971).
109 Id.
110 See Note, Boddie v. Connecticut: Free Access to Civil Courts for Indigents; 76 DICK.
L. REv. 749 (1972).
M Id. at 787.
112 See Extension of Boddie, supra note 93.

107 Note, In Forma Pauperis Relief-An Endless Road?-In Re Smith, 6 U.
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important step in making the bankruptcy discharge the substantial debtor
remedy it was intended to be." 3 A third article argued that denial of access
to bankruptcy proceedings should be a denial of due process."' This article
supported the decision, but it also noted that even if the Supreme Court
refused to establish a right of access, Congress might be provoked into
legislating a right of access. A fourth article began by drawing parallels to
criminal cases where the Court had identified a right to be heard.'1 5 The
writer then noted, that both divorce and bankruptcy are sworn to and both
allow the petitioner to start life anew. He pointed out that a fifty dollar
fee in bankruptcy was particularly illogical when there was only a fifteen
dollar fee for other proceedings. 6 He concluded that the district court
opinion had justly recognized a constitutionally protected fundamental
interest in being heard." 7 A fifth writer compared the district court decision
in Kras with the circuit court opinion in Garland and concluded that the
former was better reasoned and more likely to be followed."'
Several lower court decisions supported the district court decision in
Kras. The most important of these was decided seven months prior to Kras."9
In Smith, Judge Arraj discussed the meaning, nature, and relation of equal
protection and due process and declared: "[T]he Bankruptcy Act's filing
requirement does deny to indigents the equal protection of the laws."' 20
Judge Arraj distinguished between a right of discharge and the constitutionally
more significant right of access. He cited both cases and articles in holding
that it was a denial of court access and unconstitutional to require an
indigent to pay a fee as a condition precedent to being entitled to an order
of discharge.

121

A second decision relied on equal justice and cases involving criminal
defendants to hold that the bankruptcy filing fee, as applied to indigents,
violated the principle of equal protection of the laws.
The court stated
See Bankruptcy Filing Fee, supra note 77.
Recent Developments, 60 GEO. L.J. 1581, 1587 (1972).
115 Comment,
Constitutional Law-Indigent's Filing Fee as a Condition Precedent to
Discharge in Bankruptcy Held Unconstitutional,21 J.PuB. L. 239 (1971).
6
1 Id. Cf. 28 U.S.C. §1919 (1970), 11 U.S.C. §§68(c)(1), 76(c), 80(a) (1971).
"13

114

11' Id.

Note, Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Right of an Indigent to File Without Paying the
Required Filing Fee, 8 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 437, 441-42 (1972).
119 In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
118

20

2

Id. at 1085.

Id. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Bynum v. Connecticut Commission on Forfeited Rights, 410 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.
1969); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE LJ. 545, 559, (1967).
122 In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Ore. 1971).
121
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that the Supreme Court decision in Boddie would provide an alternate basis
for its holding since there were no relevant reasons for distinguishing
and the
between the right to be judicially freed from an unwanted spouse
2 3 A third
creditors.'
by
harassment
from
right to be judicially liberated
court relied on due process and held there was a fundamental right to start
life anew."' Several other courts relied on Boddie, Kras, Smith, In re Naron,
and O'Brien v. Trevethan to hold that it would be unconstitutional to deny
12 5
access to bankruptcy proceedings based upon the indigency of the petitioner.
Typical of these was a district court memorandum opinion which stated that
it was not necessary to reiterate the established legal analysis of the Colorado
Smith and New York Kras decisions, but that:
It is sufficient to state that both courts found the statutory requirement compelling an indigent person filing a petition in bankruptcy
to pay the filing fee as a condition precedent to being entitled to an
order of discharge violative of the equal protection principle embodied
26
in Fifth Amendment due process.'
C. The Supreme Court Decision
With the weight of six casenotes and a dozen federal district court
decisions behind it, Kras appeared to present a prime opportunity for a
learned and egalitarian decision by the Supreme Court. But it was not to be.
A five-to-four opinion reversing the decision of the district court was handed
down January 10, 1973.127 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
stated there was neither a statutory right under the Bankruptcy Act,
a constitutional right within the meanings of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, nor a common
law right to proceed in bankruptcy without payment of fees. The reasonableness of the fifty dollar fees was discussed along with the provision for paying
by installments, and the specific problems of Mr. Kras. The remainder of
the decision carefully presented and distinguished Boddie so as to leave
no doubt concerning the limitation the Court intended to place on Boddie
by its decision. The Court made clear the other remedies available in
bankruptcy, and it distinguished the fundamental interest in the marital
relationship and the dissolution of that relationship from petitioner's interest
at 1152.
O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972).
15,565 (D. Conn. 1972); In re Ottman, 336
125 See In re Haddock, 2 CCH Pov. L. REPI.
15,079 (W.D.N.Y.
F. Supp. 746 (E. D. Wisc. 1972); In re Reed, 2 CCH Pov. RFP.
(where the court
1971)
Ind.
D.
(S.
15,075
REP.
L.
Pov.
CCH
2
Passwaters,
re
1971); In
allowed in forma pauperis petition to avoid the constitutional question). See also cases
cited at United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 440 n. 5 (1973).
126 In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297, 1298 (N.D. 111 1972).
127 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).

123Id.

124
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in obtaining a discharge in bankruptcy. Chief Justice Burger in a separate
opinion added that it was for Congress to declare the policy, which the
dissenters claim already exists within the Constitution.2 8
Justices Brennan and Douglas joined in the dissent of Justice Stewart,
and in addition relied on Boiling to establish a denial of equal protection,
stating:
The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law', and therefore, we do
not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as
this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as
to be violative of due process. The invidious discrimination in the
present case is a denial of due process because it denies equal protection
within our decisions which make particular "invidious" discriminations
12 9
based on wealth or race.
Justice Stewart outlined the circumstances surrounding petitioner Kras'
decision to seek refuge in a court of bankruptcy.'
He compared the
petitioner's plight to that of Mrs. Boddie and concluded that neither could
pay court costs and neither had an effective alternative to judicial relief.
He concluded that Boddie should control and that the government should
not be allowed to pre-empt the right to dissolve legal relationships, in divorce
or bankruptcy, without affording all citizens access to the methods prescribed
for accomplishing this.'
Justice Marshall agreed with the dissenters, but focused on the extraordinary route by which the majority reached its conclusion."2 He questioned
the majority's findings that, first, the fee was reasonable and could have been
paid if petitioner really wanted a discharge; secondly, the denial of certiorari
in Garlandwas important and established precedence forthe majority's opinion
in Kras; and finally, the circumstances surrounding divorce and the Boddie
case were significantly different from the circumstances surrounding bankruptcy and the Kras decision."' Justice Marshall stated that the principle
case involved the right of access to the courts not just the right to a discharge
in bankruptcy, and that petitioner Kras was denied access to the only forum
in our legal system empowered to determine his claim. Justice Marshall
Id. at 450 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
Id. at 457, 458 (Brennan & Douglas, JJ., dissenting), citing in part Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
230 Id. at 451, 457 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3
1 1Id. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Williams v. United States
128
9

12

Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).

409 U.S. 434, 458 (1973)
MId. at 458-61.

132

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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added that only courts, and not the possibility of private settlements, could
authoritatively determine the validity of a claim of right. He concluded that
adjudication of petitioner's claim would be the only way to determine
whether a right existed:
I have some doubt about the proposition that a statutorily created
right can be finally determined by an agency, with no method for a
disappointed claimant to secure judicial review. But I have no doubt that
Congress could not provide that only the well-off had the right to
present their claims to the agency. As should be clear, the question
is one of access to the forum empowered to determine the claim of
right; it is only shorthand to call this a question of access to the
courts.'
Justice Marshall would thus give the petitioner his day in court regardless
of his financial ability to pay court costs presently or within six months.
D. Reaction to the Supreme Court Decision
The decision was reviewed with little comment, but the Wall Street
Journal began its report of the case by stating, "Some people may be too
poor to go bankrupt." 5 The Washington Post suggested that before the most
recent changes in the Court's composition, the Court would have reached
a different holding.' Fifteen journal articles discussing the decision had
been published through August 1975. Two were mere summaries of the
opinion, although they did devote as much space to the dissenting
opinions as they did to the majority decision." 7 Most of the other articles
criticized the Supreme Court for failing to hold that access to bankruptcy
proceedings constituted a fundamental right or interest that was not to be
denied indigents, although several of these articles noted that the limitation
of Boddie was to be expected.""
Id. at 462 n. 5.
Street Journal, January 11, 1973, at 11, col. 1. See Chicago Daily News, January
11, 1973, at 11, col. 6; New York Times, January 11, 1973, at 15, col. 1; St. Louis PostDispatch, January 10, 1973, at 16D, col. 1.
188 The Washington Post, January 11, 1973, at 25A, col. 1:
The opposite result apparently would have been reached if the case had been decided
last year when the late Justice Black, who was succeeded by Justice Powell, declared
that the Court's decisions compelled the striking down of bankruptcy filing fees.
187 Young, Supreme Court Report--Some People Are Too Poor Even to Go Bankrupt, 59
A.B.A.J. 287 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57 (1973).
138 Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HAv. L. REv. 1 (1973); Comment, The Right of Access to Civil Courts by Indigents: A
Prognosis, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 129 (1974); Comment, United States v. Kras: Justice at a
Price, 40 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 147 (1973); Comment, Access to Courts in Civil Cases: An
Extension of Boddie Refused, 3 CAPITAL U. L. REv. 115 (1974); Comment, The Heirs of
Boddie: Court Access for Indigent Litigants: Searching for the Remains of Boddie After
a Kras Landing, 48 IND. L.J. 452 (1973); Note, United States v. Kras-A Barrier Intact, 13
284

35 Wall
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The best article on the decision presented three tracks which it stated
the majority pursued, and then attacked the Court's finding that the
interest of the Boddie petitioners in seeking dissolution of marriage rests
on a higher constitutional plane than the interest of petitioner Kras in
securing a new start in life.13 ' The writer stated the majority failed to note
the restrictiveness of New York's bankruptcy exemption law, the effects
of insolvency upon indigent's efforts to gain employment, the ineffectiveness
of the exemption law in the face of coercive creditor action, or the consequences of action by the creditors upon the individual and his family. He
stated that the Court failed to establish a constitutional right to adjudication
of a claim to bankruptcy because it could not comprehend the effects of
insolvency.
The writer of the above article then attacked the contention of the
Court that the statute of limitations and private negotiated settlements were
meaningful alternative forms of relief. He pointed out that private negotiated
settlements hold little promise for petitioner considering his bargaining
position. He added that the period of limitation, unlike a discharge in
bankruptcy, would not provide immediate relief since in New York an
action in contract need only be commenced within six years and contract
40
judgments then survive at least twenty years.'
In addition, the writer criticized the Court's attempts to differentiate
the monopoly held by the state on divorce from the federal government's
monopoly on bankruptcy. He pointed out that both forms of relief are
restricted. Certain conduct will bar discharge and certain debts are exempt
from discharge, while generally divorce is obtainable only on specific grounds
and certain conduct may bar a divorce. He stated that the Court's statement
that bankruptcy might be enforced by an administrative agency could
also be applied to divorce actions as well as other areas of governmental
J. FAMILY L. 366 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-ConditioningIndigent's
Discharge in Bankruptcy Upon Payment of Filing Fees Held Constitutional, 25 MERCER
L. REV. 343 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law-The Indigent and Access to the Civil

Courts, 52 N.C.L. REV. 172 (1973); Comment, Constitutional Law-Right to BankruptcyEqual Protection-Due Process, 19 N.Y.L.F. 894 (1974); Comment, Bankruptcy and
the Poor, The Constitutionality of Filing Fees, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 302; Note,
Bankruptcy Law-Constitutional Law: Supreme Court Denies Indigents Access to the
Courts, 8 VAL. U. L. REv. 455 (1974). On the probability that Boddie would be limited and
restricted, as it was in Kras and Ortwein, see Note, Indigent's Access in Civil Court, 4
COLUM. HuMA RIGHTS L. REv. 267, 294 (1972). Contra, LaFrance, Constitutional Law
Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DuKE L.J. 487, 537; Comment,
Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and Advertising, 8 HAiv. Civ.
RiGHTS-CIV. LiB. L. REV. 77, 93 (1973).
139

McGuire, The Indigent Debtor's Dred Scott, 47 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1973)

cited as McGuire].
140 See New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, §§211(b), 213 (1970).
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concern, particularly those involving in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Further, he maintained that the number of indigents who are denied access to
the bankruptcy courts due to excessive fee costs remains unknown. The
writer, a referee in bankruptcy himself, concluded, "From the herniation
of reason displayed by the Court to avoid Boddie's application, the continued
1
vitality of the Boddie principles would appear to be in serious doubt."'
E. Progeny of the Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court has already issued one opinion, which relied on
Kras and further limited Boddie. In Ortwein v. Schwab... the petitioner
sought a mandamus from the Oregon Supreme Court requiring the Oregon
Court of Appeals to hear his appeal from a decision by the Oregon Public
Welfare Division to reduce his old age assistance. The Oregon Supreme Court
denied the petitions of Ortwein and the others who had joined him thus barring
claims solely because they were
them from judicial adjudication of their
3
fee.'
filing
appellate
the
pay
to
unable
The United States Supreme Court in a per curiam decision held that the
filing fee requirement was not a denial of due process because petitioners
received agency evidentiary hearings which met due process requirements. It
also held the fee requirement did not deny equal protection or unconstitutionally discriminate against the poor because the fees were needed to meet
court expenses. Finally, the Court held the fees were not arbitrary, capricious,
or in violation of equal protection since other petitioners had been allowed to
appeal in forma pauperis."'
The Court alignment was identical to that in Kras. Justices Brennan
and Stewart wrote short dissents saying the majority position was well5
established and it would do no good to set the case for oral argument.'
Justice Douglas, in dissent, emphasized petitioners were denied access solely
because of their indigency and he argued the situation of the petitioner in
Ortwein was more analogous to that in Boddie than in Kras.
I continue to beleive that this invidious discrimination against the
poverty stricken-a classification based on wealth-is proscribed by
the Equal Protection Clause ....
We are concerned in this case not with appellate review of a judicial
14 McGuire, supra note 139, at 159-61.
v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, petition for rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
3420rtwein
1"BOrtwein v. Schwab, 262 Ore. 375, 498 P.2d 757 (1972).
1,Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, petition for rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
'45Id. at 661, 664 (Brennan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
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determination, but with initial access to the courts for review of an
adverse administrative determination ....
Access to the courts before a person is deprived of valuable interests,
at least with respect to questions of law, seems to me to be the essence
of due process. We have recognized that token access cannot satisfy
the requirements of due process. Certainly, no access at all cannot
stand in better stead. 4 6
Justice Marshall also deplored the result and identified the relation between
Kras and Ortwein, but like Douglas he argued the consequences in Ortwein
were even further reaching than in Kras. "' He relied on the language of
Justice Brandeis to support his contention that there should be a right of
access which is not preconditioned on the ability to pay fees.
[T]he supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to
have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied,
and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly .

.

.

. That opportunity was denied in this case, and

important benefits were thereby taken from appellants without affording
them a chance to contest the legality of the taking in a court of law.' 8
In Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,"9 which
was handed down by the Supreme Court during the 1972 Term, the Court
upheld the Texas public school financing system against attacks that the
system discriminated against those children in the poorer districts. The three
judge federal court recommended application of a principle of fiscal neutrality,
146Id.

at 662-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 665 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 665-66, citing in part St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 (1972); Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1922); Dixon v. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). See generally CHAMBERLAIN, DOWLING, & HAYS, THE
"47

JUDICIAL

FUNCTION

IN

FEDERAL

ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES

(1942);

COOPER,

TRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS (1951); DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
ARY INQUIRY (1969); FRIENDLY, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962);

ADmINIs-

A PRELIMINLANDIS, THE

ADMINIsTRATIvE PROCESS (1938); LYNCH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION
(1939); POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-ITs GROWTH, PROCEDURE, AND
SIGNIFICANCE

(1942);

STASON

& COOPER, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS

1957);

(3d ed.

WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1967); WADE, TOWARDS ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
(1963); WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE INFORMED PROCESS (1963); Frey, The Right

of Counsel in Student Disciplinary Hearings, 5 VAL. L. REV. 48 (1970); Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612 (1970);
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 66 HARv. L. REV.
1362 (1953); Haskell, Judicial Review of School Discipline, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 211
(1970); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 368 (1968); Comment, Application of Constitutional Guarantees of Jury Trial to
the Administrative Process, 56 HARV. L. REV. 282 (1942).
149411 U.S. 1 (1973), rev'g 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
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noting that for poor districts in Texas the challenged financing system was
a tax more-spend less proposition. But the Court reversed the federal district
court decision and thus reinstated the Texas educational financing system.
The majority, which consisted of the four Nixon appointees and Justice
Stewart, acknowledged that the system favored more affluent school districts,
but held that the Constitution does not require "absolute equality or precisely
equal advantages."' 50 Rodriguez is certainly not on all fours with Kras, but
it is significant both because it is another blow against indigents and because
it is a further limitation or qualification of due process and equal protection.
The inconsistency between Brown and Rodriguez is obvious from the statement by Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Rodriguez, that the
Supreme Court does not consider the right to education to be among the
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights which require the Court to
apply strict judicial scrutiny: "It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws."'' The decision in Rodriguez was attacked both by Justices and
legal scholars, and the weight of prior scholarly argument and lower court
52
decisions were contrary to the majority opinion.'
150 Id. at 24.
151 Id. at 33.
152 Id. at 70 (Marshall J., dissenting); Van Dusartz v. Harfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D.C. Minn.
1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson
v. Cahill, 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (Super Ct.), enforcing 118 N.J. Super. 223,
287 A.2d 187 (Super. Ct. 1972); Sweetwater County Planning Committee v. Hinkle, 491
P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971); Porras, The Rodriguez Case-A Crossroad in Public School
Financing, 26 TAx LAWYER 141, 160 (1972); Note, An Attack on the Texas Financing
System-Rodriguez v. San Antonio School District, 26 Sw. L.J. 608, 613 (1972); Wall
Street Journal, March 22, 1973, at 3, col. 2 (Remarks of Professor Wise).
For comment on and support of the position of the California Supreme Court in
Serrano, see COONS, CLUNE, & SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 6-7,
201-42 (1970); MOSTELLER & MOYNIHAN, ON EQUALITY oF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
(1972); WIsE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 147 (1968); Berke, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or Millstone for School
Financing?, 21 J. PUBLIC L. 23 (1971); Bloomfield, Equality of Educational Opportunity:
Judicial Supervision of Public Education, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 275 (1970); Coons, Fairness
in the Distribution of Education, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 219; Coons, Clune, & Sugarman,
Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financing Structures,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 305 (1969); Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A
Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504 (1972);
Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of ConstitutionalJurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 583 (1968); Kurland, Wise & Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and
Equal Protection, 38 HARv. EDUC. REV. 635 (1968); Moynihan, Solving the Equal Educational Opportunity Dilemma: Equal Dollars Is Not Equal Opportunity, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
259; Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1355
(1971); Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial
Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 WiS. L. REV. 7; Weitz, Equal Educational
Opportunity in the Allocation of Public School Faculties, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 341
(1970). See also OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF H.E.W., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); Overlan, An Equal Chance to Learn, NEW REPUBLIC, May
13, 1972, at 20-21; Note, Serrano v. Priest: Renaissance for School Financing Through the
Equal Protection Clause, 21 AM. U. L. REV. 685 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing
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VII. CONCLUSION

It was over twenty years ago that Chief Justice Vinson handed down
the first Brown decision. It is to be hoped that shifts in the political alignment
or legal philosophy of the Court will lead to a second consideration of Kras,
but this is unlikely. Appraising the attitude of the Court last term toward the
poor can only lead to conclusions that: first, we have reached the low arc
in the cyclical history of the development and expansion of individual rights,
and secondly, an individual's claims may receive constitutional sanction if
the individual is non-white, female, or a criminal defendant, but only heaven
can help the individual whose claim is based on poverty." 3 Justice and
equity compel reversal of Kras and Ortwein not only for the sake of indigents,
but also for the integrity of our democracy. Whether the ultimate verdict is
based on the Bible, the Magna Carta, the Constitution, a common law right
of access, the arguments of indigent petitioners, or sheer equity, the courts
or Congress must acknowledge a right of access to proceedings which
affect and determine the claims, privileges, and rights of individuals to their
freedom and property. This right must not be conditioned on the ability
to pay costs and fees. Only when such a right is established will judicial and
administrative remedies be meaningful for those who need them the most.
Costs could still be retained for non-indigents, all indigents could be allowed
to proceed in forma pauperis, or, in bankruptcy, the fees could be exempted
from discharge as are taxes. The only possible remaining justification for
affirming Kras would be that it is inconsistent with our competitive, rugged,
Case: Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14 Aiuz. L. REv. 88 (1972);
Note, Constitutional Law-California School Financing System Which DiscriminatesAgainst
Students in Poorer School Districts Held to Be in Violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, 60 GEo. L.J. 799 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-School Financing System
Based on Local Property Taxes Which Results in Inequalities of Spending by School Districts
Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1972); Note, Serrano v.
Priest: The End of an Era in Public School Financing, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 365 (1972); Note,
Equal Protection and Public School Financing: Serrano v. Priest, 5 LoYoLA OF L.A. L. REV.
162 (1972); Note, Equal Protection in School Financing, 43 Miss. LJ. 266 (1972); Note,
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-FinancingPublic Education-A Challenge to California's Allocation of EducationalRevenues Sustained, 47 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 690 (1972);
Note, Equal Educational Opportunity: A Case for the Children, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 280
(1971); Note, Constitutional Law-A Public School Financing System Which Relies Heavily
on Local Property Taxes and Causes Substantial Disparities Among Individual School
Districts in the Amount of Revenue Available Per Pupil for the District's Education Grants
Invidiously Discriminates Against the Poor and Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 3
ST. MARY'S L.J. 347 (1971); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection--SchoolFinancing
System Which Substantially Relies on Local Property Tax Violates Equal Protection Clause,
24 VAND. L. REV. 1265 (1971); Note, The Aftermath of Serrano: The Strict Scrutiny
Approach and the Viability of Property Tax Financing for Public Educational Systems,
17 VILL. L. REv. 928 (1972).
153 See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656, petition for rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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individualistic, capitalistic heritage for an individual not to pull his share
and pay his own way. It even sounds like the fundamentalist American
Spirit to cry, "By God, if a man wants to go bankrupt let him get down and
go to work and pay for it like a real one hundred percent American." The
majority opinion in Kras was more subtle, but the intent and consequences
of the decision are crystal clear.
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